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Abstract 
 
The  goal  of this  paper  is to assess  the  impact on the  performance of firms 
that participate in Research Joint Ventures (RJVs) funded by the Fifth European 
Framework Programme for Research and  Technological Development (EU-FP5). 
A special emphasis is made  on the  User-friendly Information Society (IST) 
programme, one of the  most  important thematic programmes of the  EU-FP5. 
We use the funding available to the firms  as an instrumental variable to account 
for self-selection and  estimate the  Local  Average Treatment Effect (LATE) of 
participation by considering labor  productivity and  profit  margin as  
performance measures. Our  results show a large  and  positive impact of 
participation on the labor  productivity of the  firms, whereas the  effect  on profit  
margin is weaker. When taking into account the  size of the  RJV, we find  that 
the  positive impact on labor productivity comes  mainly from participation in 
large  projects and that participation in smaller RJVs has a negative effect  on the 
profit  margin. 
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1 Introduction
Research and development (R&D) investments are awed by two important char-
acteristics that make their free-market equilibrium levels less than socially desir-
able. First, R&D is non-rival in that the knowledge produced by a rm's in-
vestment does not prevent other rms to access the same amount of information.
Second, it is characterized by spillovers: A rm investing in R&D usually imposes
a positive externality on the other rms which can appropriate the results of this
investment (see De Bondt (1997) for a review).
By and large, two types of public policies are used to try to solve this problem:
Direct subsidies and internalization of the externality through research collabora-
tion. The former is aimed at modifying the marginal return of R&D investments,
while the latter (partially) solves the appropriability problem. Another public
policy involves a mix of these two instruments, where the government grants
subsidies to a group of rms to encourage them to collaborate within an R&D
project or a research joint venture (RJV). This is the type of public policy used
by the European Union (EU) in its Framework Programmes (FPs). Since 1984,
research and innovation activities from the EU are bundled into the EU-FPs.
They have been the main nancial tools with which the EU Commission has sup-
ported cooperative R&D activities, and the EU participation in the coordination
and nancing of RJVs has been increasing until today.1
In this paper, we provide empirical evidence on the eect of these FPs on
various rm level performance measures such as productivity and protability.
So far, evaluation studies on these programmes have not really helped under-
stand their impact on the competitiveness of European industries. Luukkonen
(1998) argues that there are two main reasons to this lack of understanding. The
rst comes from the general nature of the objectives pursued by the EU Com-
mission and the ensuing diculty in evaluating their attainment. The second
concern problems in the evaluation studies themselves, and the fact that they are
part of the political process which formulates these programmes, leading to less
critical and internal evaluation. Georghiou and Roessner (2000) also point out
many diculties in realizing thorough evaluations of technology programs. Due
to the large amount of public funds raised by the EU-FPs and to the potential
1FP1, FP2, FP3, FP4, and FP5 were allocated 3.75, 5.4, 6.6, 13.2, and 14.960 millions e
respectively (see Artis and Nixson (2001)).
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problems that RJVs may cause vis-a-vis European competition policy standards,
these results seem rather disappointing.
Some other studies have been carried by academic researchers and have tried
to analyze the impact of RJV participation on innovative output, such as sales
of innovative products or patenting activity (Branstetter and Sakakibara (1998),
Branstetter and Sakakibara (2002), Dekker and Kleinknecht (2008), Czarnitzki,
Ebersberger, and Fier (2007)), or on economic performance, as measured by rm
productivity or prot margin (Irwin and Klenow (1996), Belderbos, Carree, and
Lokshin (2004), Cincera, Kempen, van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, Veugelers,
and Villegas Sanchez (2003), Siebert (1996)). This literature supports a posi-
tive relationship between R&D cooperation and innovation but shows less clear
results on the impact of collaboration on competitiveness and economic results
of the rms. On top of that, the studies concerning the eect of participation
in the EU-FP on rm performance are rather scarce. Some exceptions are Ben-
fratello and Sembenelli (2002) and Barajas, Huergo, and Moreno (2009). The
former analyzes the impact of participation in FP3 and FP4 on productivity for
manufacturing rms but nd no signicant eect. The latter uses a structural
approach to estimate the eect of participation in EU-FPs on economic perfor-
mance for Spanish rms between 1995 and 2005 (hence covering part of FP4
(1994-1998), all of FP5 (1998-2002) and part of FP6 (2002-2006)). They nd a
positive impact on the technological capacity of rms (measured by intangible
xed assets, an indirect measure of innovation output), which is positively related
to their economic performance, measured by labor productivity.
The Fifth Framework Programme had a budget of EUR 14.96 billion for the
period 1998-2002 and is composed of four dierent thematic programmes. In
this paper, we focus on the one that had the largest budget allocation, the User-
friendly Information Society (IST) programme, with a budget of EUR 3.6 billion.
We analyze it in more detail by looking into its eects on the performance of
participating rms. Furthermore, a special emphasis is made on the reforms
undertaken by the programme with respect to its predecessors. We take into ac-
count the dierent instruments from the programme (the so-called Key Actions
and the various types of contracts oered to participants) to isolate any potential
impact on the participants' economic performance. We take into account and
adjust for self-selection of rms into the programme by using instrumental vari-
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ables estimation methods. Moreover, our database allows us to introduce a time
lag of as much as four years from the start of each project in order to look at the
long term eects of participation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes
theoretical and empirical literature on the subject. Section 3 presents the struc-
ture of the EU-FP5 and its main characteristics. Section 4 presents the data and
the construction of the dataset. Section 5 shows some descriptive statistics while
section 6 is devoted to the empirical model and the discussion of the estimation
results.
2 Related literature
The growth of R&D partnerships observed since the 1980's has generated an
increasing interest in such collaboration activities for both academics and policy
makers (Hagedoorn (2002)). A rst theoretical approach on the subject is oered
by the management and business literature and justies the creation of R&D
collaborative agreements by the opportunity they give to minimize transaction
costs and exploit complementary know-how between participants (Kogut (1988)).
The second strand of literature comes from the Industrial Organization (IO)
theory and focuses on the imperfect appropriability of R&D results presented
above.2 The theoretical IO literature has mainly focused on horizontal R&D
cooperation (i.e. on the collaboration between rms that are competitors in the
product market) and on the impact of these agreements and knowledge spillovers
on the incentives to innovate.
The basic theoretical models analyzing RJVs started developing in the mid-
1980's and mainly focus on comparing the welfare implications of R&D coop-
eration with the ones of R&D competition (Katz (1986), Spence (1984), and
d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988)).3 The vast majority of these models con-
clude that spillovers have an important role in dening the relative eciencies of
cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios. The eect of a joint venture in R&D
is an increase in the prots for both rms (for any spillover value) and an increase
2Hagedoorn, Link, and Vonortas (2000) distinguish between three categories of literature,
dividing the business literature into transaction costs and strategic management literature.
3See also Kamien, Muller, and Zang (1992), Suzumura (1992), Leahy and Neary (1997), and
Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998). A survey on the literature can be found in Veugelers (1998).
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in R&D investment and welfare if the spillovers are large enough.4
While the theoretical literature on RJVs is substantial, the empirical studies
on the subject are rather scarce. The empirical literature can broadly be divided
into two categories. The rst one consists of papers analyzing the determinants of
RJV participation, while the second category analyzes the impact of collaboration
on performance. The present paper falls under this last category by trying to as-
sess the eects of the European Union Fifth Framework Programme for Research
and Technological Development (FP5) on the performance of its participants.
A rst set of studies has focused on the determinants of RJV formation and
participation. Hernan, Marn, and Siotis (2003) analyze the determinants of
participation in European RJVs and nd that sectorial R&D intensity, industry
concentration, rm size, technological spillovers, and past RJV participation pos-
itively inuence the probability of forming RJVs. Marn and Siotis (2008) extend
this analysis by exploiting the dierences in institutional design of two European
collaboration programmes (EUREKA and the EU-FP) and relating them to RJV
participants' characteristics. Firms frequently participating in EU-FP RJVs are
primarily large rms in intensive R&D sectors. As pointed by the authors, this
might reect a preference for EU authorities for rms sharing these character-
istics, but it may also suggest that an EU-FP RJV is an attractive option for
projects involving large R&D outlays because of the cost-sharing element. They
also note that past experience in the EU-FPs is an important factor explaining
participation. Roller, Siebert, and Tombak (2007) nd that cost-sharing is an
important motive for RJV participation. Moreover, rms asymmetries also plays
a key role since similarly sized rms are more likely to form an RJV. Finally,
rms are more likely to engage in further RJVs when their participation rate in
other RJVs is higher.
The second category of empirical studies analyzes the eect of participation
on performance. Branstetter and Sakakibara (1998) and Branstetter and Sakak-
ibara (2002) analyze the impact of Japanese government-sponsored research con-
sortia on the research productivity of participating rms. It is found that rms
which participate in more research consortia do spend more on R&D and that
an additional project per year raises a rm's R&D productivity. The greater
4When rms do cooperate and information leakage is high, they internalize this eect and
increase their R&D investment relative to the non-cooperative scenario. It is important to
emphasize that if an RJV is formed in these models, it will always encompass the whole industry.
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the potential spillovers within a consortium, the greater the equilibrium level of
R&D expenditure by member rms. Moreover, technological proximity has a sig-
nicantly positive eect on consortium outcome (i.e., the amount of patenting),
while product market proximity has a signicantly negative eect on consortium
outcome. Finally, another important suggestion of their analysis is that the de-
sign of a consortium matters much more than the level of resources expended on
it.
Studies trying to measure the impact of cooperation on the economic perfor-
mance of rms rather then their innovative performance is quite scarce. An early
work analyzing the eect of RJV participation on rm economic performance
is the one by Siebert (1996). Analyzing 314 US joint ventures, he shows that
cooperation has no direct impact on prot margin, but does increase the eect
of R&D intensity on the prot margin. Belderbos, Carree, and Lokshin (2004)
study the impact of cooperation on rms' performance (labor productivity and
productivity in innovative sales new to the market) and dierentiate between the
type of R&D partner (competitors, suppliers, customers, and universities and
research institutes). They nd that supplier and competitor cooperation has a
signicant impact on labor productivity growth. Cooperation between rms and
universities or research institutes (as well as cooperation with competitors) has
a positive impact on growth in sales per employee of products and services new
to the market.
Benfratello and Sembenelli (2002) carry an analysis to evaluate the impact
of European collaboration programs on participating rms' productivity (labor
productivity, total factor productivity and price cost margin). They study the
impact of two dierent programs, EUREKA and the (3rd and 4th) EU-FPs in the
1992-1996 period. In EU-FP, projects are funded and co-ordinated by the Eu-
ropean Commission (top-down structure) whereas EUREKA projects have a de-
centralized funding source and research projects are proposed and dened by the
participants themselves (bottom-up structure). Hence, the public involvement is
larger in EU-FP. The main results of the analysis is that rms participating in
EUREKA have experienced a signicant improvement in their performance mea-
sures. On the other hand, rms participating in RJVs under the EU-FP scheme
do not show any signicant change in performance.
Another study that is concerned with the impact of the EU-FP is the one by
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Dekker and Kleinknecht (2008). Using data from the Community Innovation Sur-
vey (CIS) that directly measures innovation, they test the eects of the Program
on the participants' R&D input and innovative output, measured as the sales of
innovative products per employee. Their main result is that after correcting for
self-selection, participation in the EU-FP does not increase the sales of innovative
products. Results also show that there is a signicant increase in R&D eorts for
small rms who participate in an EU-FP project, while participation by medium
and large rms has no signicant impact on R&D intensities.
Finally, a recent study by Barajas, Huergo, and Moreno (2009) analyzes the
impact of participation in the EU-FP on labor productivity of Spanish manufac-
turing rms between 1995 and 2005. Their approach follows the work of Crepon,
Duguet, and Mairesse (1998) and considers that participation in the EU-FP has
an indirect eect on productivity through the generation of new knowledge. In
other words, participation has a positive impact on rms' technological capa-
bilities (captured by intangible xed assets), which in turn have an eect on
rms' performance, measured by labor productivity. They also use data on ac-
cepted and rejected applications to estimate a selection equation to correct for
self-selection.
3 The European Union Framework Programmes
The main objective of European policies toward research joint ventures in the
beginning of the 1980's was to ght the relative decline in the international com-
petitiveness of high technology sectors. Other factors specic to the European
Community (EC) also inuenced the need for these policies. For instance, there
were large dierences between the many country members in terms of indus-
trial and technological capabilities. Some members also had an already well
established policy infrastructure for Science and Technology while others totally
lacked such infrastructures. Finally, there was no appropriate legal framework
and institutions at the EC level for supporting a consistent technology policy. In
1981, these considerations led the European Commission to establish the pilot
ESPRIT program with the endorsement of the twelve largest European producers
of electronics (Hagedoorn, Link, and Vonortas (2000)).
The remaining foundations for the development of European Union (EU)
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research policy came with the formation of the EU Framework Programme (EU-
FP). The First Framework Programme, which started in 1984 and ended in 1987,
came in response to a situation where individual R&D activities were uncoordi-
nated and required a large number of Council decisions (Georghiou (2001)).
Also at that time arose the formal expression of the policy rationale for the
Community action in the eld of research and technological cooperation. This
is embedded in the principle of subsidiarity, which states that support should
come where the scale or cost of cooperation was beyond that aordable by a
single country, where complementarily in national work could achieve results for
the whole Community, and where research contributes to development of the
common market, laws and standards, or to the unication of European science
and technology (Georghiou (2001)).
Since 1984, research and innovation activities from the EU are hence bundled
into the EU-FP. These have been the main nancial tools with which the EU
supports R&D activities covering almost all scientic disciplines. Six FPs have
already been completed and the seventh has just been started in 2007. Each
of these programmes covers a period of ve years with the last year of one FP
and the rst year of the following FP overlapping.5 The aim of these EU-FPs
is to support and encourage European research, but the detailed objectives of
each programme vary from one funding period to another. All of the RJVs that
are formed under this programme are eligible for an EU subsidy, which varies
according to the nature of the project. One important characteristic of EU-
FP projects is their \pre-competitive" orientation, necessary to avoid conict
with the EU competition law. Dened more precisely, pre-competitive research
concerns R&D for which commercial possibilities remain ve to ten years in the
future (Luukkonen (1998)).
The main objective of the FP5 is to stimulate transnational collaboration in
research, particularly between industry and universities, and the establishment
of networks of excellence.6 The FP5 comprises four thematic programmes, each
addressing a series of scientic, technological and societal issues7. The four the-
matic programmes are (i) Quality of Life and Management of Living Resources
5The seven FPs cover the periods 1984-1987, 1987-1991, 1990-1994, 1994-1998, 1998-2002,
2002-2006, and 2007-2013.
6See European Commission (2000) and European Commission (2001).
7Aside from these, there are three horizontal programmes that address generic issues.
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(QUALITY), (ii) User-friendly Information Society (IST), (iii) Competitive and
Sustainable Growth (GROWTH), (iv-a) Energy, Environment and Sustainable
Development (EESD), and (iv-b) Nuclear Energy (EESD/EURATOM). In turn,
the three horizontal programmes are (i) Conrming the International Role of
Community Research (INCO), (ii) Promotion of Innovation and Encouragement
of Participation of SMEs (INNOVATION & SME), and (iii) Improving Human
Research Potential and the Socio-economic Knowledge Base (HUMAN POTEN-
TIAL). In this paper we focus on the most important programme in terms of
budget allocation, the User-friendly Information Society (IST) programme.
It is important to note that the European Commission does not itself under-
take or participate in the EU-FP projects. Its role is to oer nancial or other
support to private and public research bodies, and companies and institutions
wishing to embark on a research project. Each year throughout the period of
the FP5, the commission publishes so-called workprogrammes that contain dif-
ferent calls for proposals that describe the objectives planned (Zobel (1999)).
The proposal of a project must then be submitted in response to these specic
calls. This means that unsolicited project proposals are not allowed and the
project's content must correspond to the objectives set out by the commission.
Also, several eligibility criteria must be satised by the dierent partners involved
in the project. One of them is that the project must involve at least two legal
entities (e.g. individuals, industrial and commercial rms including SMEs, uni-
versities, research bodies, technology dissemination bodies) independent of each
other and established in two dierent Member States or in a Member State and
an associated country.8
The nancial contribution from the Commission consists in the reimbursement
of a set percentage of the participants' eligible expenses, although sometimes
at-rate contributions are made. In order to be reimbursed by the Commission,
participants must identify and report their eligible expenses by submitting interim
and nal statements. In particular, the expenses must be necessary for the action
in question, provided for in the contract, actually incurred and recorded in the
accounts. Finally, it is important to note that participants cannot establish
intellectual property rights over their discoveries: all research must be shared
8This means that entities established outside the EU and international organizations can
also participate.
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among partners.
4 Data and variables
The empirical analysis will be carried out using a database constructed from two
dierent sources. The data from the EU-FP projects will rst be taken from
the Community Research and Development Information Service (CORDIS) web
page. We will focus on the projects involved in the User-friendly Information
Society (IST) programme. Available on the CORDIS web page is a total number
of 2522 projects.9
The second source of information is the one about the participating rms.
Once the information about each project is recovered, we can look at each par-
ticipating rm individually and obtain rm-level data. This latter task will be
done using Amadeus (Analyse MAjor Databases from EUropean Sources), a
data base produced by BUREAU Van DIJK, a specialist provider of rm-level data.
The nal data set is constructed using the information from the two sources
presented above. Firms participating in projects recovered from the CORDIS
web page are linked to the Amadeus database in order to retrieve the relevant
information at the rm-level. The Amadeus database contains balance sheet
information on the top 250,000 rms in Europe. The CORDIS database provides
information on each project, i.e. its description, its reference, the starting and
ending dates of the project, its status and its acronym, the contract type oered
to the participants, the cost of the project as well as the funding provided by the
European Commission. The name of the coordinator of the project and of the
participating rms are given as well.
We were able to retrieve 961 rms that participated in at least one FP5
RJV from Amadeus. Table 1 gives the dierent number of RJVs the rms
participate in and shows how some rms were often involved in more than one
project. We decided to focus on the rms that participate in one project only.
This corresponds to a total of 620 rms participating in 466 projects. After
cleaning the dataset, we end up with a total of 379 participants that correspond
to 315 projects.
9All the projects' fact sheets are available at http://cordis.europa.eu/ist/projects/projects.htm.
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5 Descriptive Statistics
We present some descriptive statistics of the constructed database. We rst
describe the main characteristics of the EU-FP5 projects before turning to the
description of the participating rms.
5.1 Projects description
Table 2 presents some average values for the projects included in the database.
The column All Projects represents all the projects we could recover from the
CORDIS webpage for the EU-FP5 (2359 projects), while the column Single Part
contains the projects in which only single participants (in our data set, that is)
are involved (466 projects). The last column Sample contains information on the
projects that correspond to the participating rms present in our nal sample
(315 projects). The projects that we are able to analyze seem to be larger in
terms of number of participants and cost. Unless otherwise stated, the next
tables will present statistics of the projects included in our nal sample.
Table 4 provides summary statistics on the number of participants by project.
We can see that the projects are more or less evenly distributed, with a higher
proportion incorporating 6 to 10 participants. The duration is on average lower
when projects have few participants (0 to 3) and the cost of each RJV is increasing
with the number of participating rms. Concerning the cost of the dierent
projects, table 5 reveals that the majority of RJVs have costs between 0 and
6 millions euros, with a peak for the ones with costs between 1 and 3 millions.
Finally, table 6 shows that the vast majority of the RJVs last from 1 to 3 years.
5.2 Comparison of Amadeus and Participants
In this section we look at the characteristics of the participants that are included
in our database. We rst compare them with the overall Amadeus database in
order to see if there are some important dierences. Indeed, one important prob-
lem one has to deal with when evaluating the impact of government-sponsored
R&D is the one of selection bias since it is hard to think of RJV participation
as being randomly assigned or decided. This inevitably creates a potentially im-
portant bias in the estimated impact parameters (Klette, Moen, and Griliches
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(2000)).
We give a rst look at this potential selection problem by comparing basic
statistics. Table 7 gives summary statistics on some variables for both the par-
ticipants and non-participating rms in Amadeus for 1999. Participants have
signicantly larger gures for most of the variable considered, conrming the fact
that the programme selects larger rms for participation. Further evidence of this
fact is given in gure 1, which shows the distributions of the log transformation
of sales, employees and xed assets for both participants and rms contained in
Amadeus. In all cases the participants' distribution is similar to the one of the
outsiders, only shifted to the right.
6 Empirical model
To perform our empirical test, we use three dierent samples. The rst one
is composed of the participating rms and of non-participating rms randomly
picked from Amadeus. After cleaning the data, we are left with 2134 observa-
tions for participants and 6638 for the selected non-participants over the years
1997 to 2006. This sample is referred to as the Random sample throughout
the text. As in Benfratello and Sembenelli (2002), the alternative control group
used in our estimations is constructed by selecting non-participating rms from
Amadeus so as to replicate the cross-tabulation of participants by country and
industry. After cleaning the data, we are left with 2134 observations for partici-
pants and 3531 for the selected non-participants over the years 1997 to 2006. In
our estimations, we call this sample IC-Rep (for Industry Country Replication).
Last, we use a third control group constructed so as to replicate the distribution
of the sales variables of the participants for 1999 (i.e. before the start of any
project). The nal kernel density estimates of the control group for 1999 are
presented in gure 1. After cleaning the data, we are left with 2134 observations
for participants and 3726 for the selected non-participants over the years 1997 to
2006. We call this sample Sales-Rep in our estimations.
We provide an empirical test on the eect of participation in the User Friendly
Information Society programme of the EU-FP5 on the rms' performance. The
performance measures that will be considered are labor productivity, measured
as added value per employee, and prot margin, measured as the prot (be-
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fore taxation) over the operating revenue. In what follows we will use the term
performance to denote either of these two measures.
Let Pit = 1 be the event of rm i participating in a project at time t and let
yit be the measure of rm i's performance. Denote by y
0
it and y
1
it the performance
of rm i at time t when it does not and when it does participate in EU-FP5
respectively. Hence we write
yit =
(
y1it if Pit = 1
y0it if Pit = 0:
Equivalently, yit can be expressed as
yit = y
0
it + (y
1
it   y0it)Pit: (1)
We want to know the eect of participation at time t on the rm's performance
yit. This eect can be expressed as it  y1it   y0it. It measures the dierence
between the observed performance of participant i and the performance it would
have reached had it not participated in the project. Since the counterfactual out-
come y0it can never be observed for a participating rm, it cannot be computed
directly and needs to be estimated. If we consider a constant treatment eect,
i.e. it = y
1
it   y0it = , we can rewrite (1) as
yit = +   Pit + "it; (2)
where "it is an error term. A direct approach to circumvent the missing coun-
terfactual problem is to replace the missing counterfactual outcome by the mean
performance of the non-participating rms. This would be a simple treatment-
control comparison (TCC) estimator as it mimics the analysis in an experimental
setting. The estimator of , bTCC , would then be the mean dierence in perfor-
mance between participants and non-participants.
At this point, it is important to clarify the denition of the participation
dummy variable Pit. Notice that we have so far assumed that Pit = 1 if rm i
participates in an RJV at time t. However, it may well be that this rm had been
involved in the project for several periods prior to t. But the point is whether
rm i is currently involved in an RJV at time t. Notice, however, the drawback
of this denition for the participation dummy. Firm i may be considered non-
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participant at time t if it is not involved in any project at that time (i.e. Pit = 0)
although it may have participated in a project prior to t. This suggests another
denition of participation. We will create the dummy PARTSit that takes the
value one from time t onwards if rm i was involved in an RJV at time t and
0 otherwise. In other words, we have that PARTSit = 1 if rm i has already
entered or is currently participating in a project at time t, whereas PARTSit = 0
if rm i has not entered any project at time t yet. It follows that the coecient
on this new dummy has now to be interpreted as the eect of participating (or
having participated) in a project on the mean productivity compared to a rm
that is not participating in any project.
A simple treatment-control comparison in the form of equation (2) is most
likely to yield inconsistent estimates. As mentioned above, bTCC will suer from
a selection bias since it is hard to think of participation into the EU-FP5 as being
random. Selection bias comes from the existence of rms' characteristics (be they
observable or not) that are correlated with participation in the programme. To
the extend that the programme attracts bigger and more productive rms, we
have to deal with a positive selection bias. We therefore also control for observable
characteristics x that aect both the decision to participate (treatment) and the
productivity of the rm (outcome). Doing so leads to the following specication:
yit+ = x
0
it +   PARTSit + "it+ : (3)
Estimation of  from equation (3) allows to control at least for selection on
observable characteristics. Size eect is controlled for by including in vector x
the log of employees. Also included in x are the ratio of tangible xed assets over
employees (in logs) as a proxy of physical capital intensity and the ratio of intan-
gible xed assets over employees (in logs) as a proxy of knowledge capabilities.
We also include as an explanatory variable the total number of partners with
which a rm collaborates within a given project. Finally, a set of 2-digit industry
dummies, grouped into 19 industries, as well as country and time dummies are
included to control for industry, country and time eects.
Columns (OLS) of tables 11 and 12 show the results of estimating (3) by
pooled OLS for years 2000 to 2006. In table 11, the dependant variable is the
logarithm of labor productivity, while in table 12 the dependant variable is the
prot margin. The results show that the average impact of participation on labor
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productivity is positive and signicant, whereas the eect on the prot margin
shows up to be non signicant and rather small.
The estimation strategies presented above allowed to solve for the selection
problem to the extend that rms self-selected in the programme based on some
observable characteristics we could control for. However, if rms decide on par-
ticipation based on unobservable characteristics included in "it, the endogeneity
problem will remain and estimators will still be inconsistent. In our case it is most
likely that rms do in fact decide on participation based on some unobservable
characteristics. For example we can think of rms as having some \managerial"
or \innovative" ability that may inuence on their decision to participate in an
RJV. One possibility to overcome this issue is to take advantage of the panel
structure of our data to allow for possible time-invariant unobservable rm char-
acteristics that may inuence participation in the programme. Assuming that
the unobserved characteristics in (3) can be decomposed as "it = i + uit allows
for correlation between the participation variable PARTSit and the time-invariant
rm specic eect i. This leads to the following specication
yit+ = x
0
it +   PARTSit + t + i + uit+ ; (4)
where uit is an i.i.d. zero mean random variable assumed to be uncorrelated
with xit and the time eects t have now been made explicit.
We can use xed-eects estimation to obtain a consistent estimator of  in
(4) provided the participation dummy, PARTSit, is strictly exogenous. We hence
need that COV(uis;PARTSit) = 0 for any t and s. Tables 8 and 9 show the
results of the xed-eects estimation of (4) using data pooled over the years 2000
to 2006. The results now show an average eect of participation that is close to
zero and non signicant on both of our performance measures. Hence we have
that when controlling for self-selection (and assuming that the latter is based on
unobservable characteristics that remain constant over time) participation has,
on average, no eect on the economic performance of the rms. These results
are in accordance with the results of the previous literature that we presented
above.10
10Note that the necessary condition for the consistency of the xed eects estimator is likely
to be violated if programme participation changes in reaction to past outcomes of yit. In this
case, we have that COV(uis;PARTSit) 6= 0 for s < t. Klette, Moen, and Griliches (2000) give
an example from the study of Klette and Moen (1999) in which the government was supporting
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In the next section we turn to an instrumental variables estimation strategy
to circumvent the self-selection issue.
6.1 Instrumental Variables estimation
Estimation by instrumental variables requires nding a variable (the instrument)
that determines programme participation (i.e. that is correlated with PARTSit)
and that is uncorrelated with the error term "it. The empirical strategy is then
to estimate the impact of participation in two steps. We rst need to specify an
equation explaining the participation decision. In particular, we assume that the
probability that rm i decides to engage in an RJV is given by
Pr(PARTi = 1 j z) = F(z0it): (5)
The variables in the vector x in (3) are a subset of the variables in z. That
is, at least one element of z (call it z1) is unique and is a non-trivial determinant
of PARTi. Hence z1 is an instrument correlated with the endogenous dummy
variable PARTit but that has no direct eect on the outcome yit (it only has an
eect through PARTit). We will specify F () to be the cumulative distribution
function of the logistic distribution and hence estimate (5) by logit. The rst
step of the estimation consists in estimating (5) in order to obtain the predicted
values\PARTi. The second step uses these predicted values to run regression (3).
We use the following variables to explain the participation decision into the
programme. We rst account for the logarithm of employees, which is used as a
measure of rm size. This variable may have an important eect on participation
in case specic xed costs for the creation of an RJV exist. We also introduce as
an explanatory variable the ratio of tangible xed assets over employees (in logs)
as a proxy of physical capital intensity. Another variable that may inuence the
willingness to participate in an RJV is the relative size of the rm within the
industry in which it operates. As noted by Hernan, Marn, and Siotis (2003),
relative size may matter if RJVs are used as a vehicle for pursuing \technology
watch", i.e. to monitor innovative activity in their segment. As they point out,
the largest rms (which are also the technology leaders), have most to lose from
large rms facing severe problems when the IT industry was restructured towards the end of
the 1980's. In such case, the xed eects estimator above would underestimate the impact of
participation on the participants.
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the emergence of new, technologically advanced rivals (see also Laredo (1998)).
This measure is proxied by the introduction of a variable measuring market share,
calculated as rm size over industry size, both measured by the amount of sales.11
One main shortcoming of our dataset is the unavailability of R&D expenses
at the rm level. In order to overcome this problem, we use the ratio of intan-
gible xed assets over employees (in logarithm) as a measure of the intensity of
the rm's innovative activity. In any case, this variable is likely to be highly
correlated with a rm's \absorptive capacity", increasing the likelihood of par-
ticipation in an RJV. A measure of industry concentration is also included with
the Herndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).12 This indicator can have an ambigu-
ous eect on participation. A highly concentrated industry can facilitate the
identication of suitable partners and spillovers to non-participants are limited
because of their reduced number. Also, an RJV may well be created in order to
weaken competition or increase the market power of its participants, in which
case concentration would increase the likelihood of RJV participation. However,
strict limits are imposed on collaborative projects in concentrated industries by
competition policy.13
Country dummy variables as well as industry dummies are included in the
analysis. Last, we use the funds available for each rm as an exogenous variable
to explain participation. The budget dedicated to R&D (through the funding of
RJVs) for, say, industry i is likely to be correlated with the participation decision
of rms from this same industry. A rm will be more willing to participate if
it knows that more funding is available, and the commission will also be more
likely to accept a project if it has more funding to oer. On the other hand, the
budget is unlikely to be correlated with the unobserved variables aecting labor
productivity of the rm and willingness to participate in the programme since its
allocation is not made as a function of the participants or potential participants14.
This instrumental variable was rst used by Lichtenberg (1988) to identify the
11This index is constructed over the entire Amadeus database at the 4-digits industry level.
12Similarly to our market share measure, this index is constructed over the entire Amadeus
database at the 4-digits industry level.
13An example is the EU's block exemption which automatically allows ventures between
rms that collectively represent less than 25% of the relevant anti-trust market but requires
authorization for values above that threshold.
14This remark is drawn from discussions with the programme's managers at the European
Commission.
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eects of \procurement by design and technical competition" contracts on rms'
R&D investments. It has to our knowledge never been used in the analysis of the
EU-FPs nor in the context of RJV studies. To construct the variable representing
the \available funding", we rst sum the funding received by all the participating
rms in a given industry (dened at the 4-digit level). Hence the funding available
to industry i is given by the following expression:
AVFUNDi =
X
RJVj
dij  Fundingj;
where dij is a dummy equal to 1 if the a rm from industry i participates in
RJV j, and Fundingj is the funding received by RJV j from the commission.
With these covariates properly dened, we can now rewrite equation (5) as
Pr(PARTi = 1 j z) =F(z0it)
=F
 
0 + 1 log(Employees)it + 2 log
FixedAssets
Employees

it
+3 log
IntangibleAssets
Employees

it
+ 4HHIit + 5MktShareit
+6 log(AvailableFunding)i
+
CX
c=1
cCountryic +
JX
j=1
jIndustryij +
99X
s=98
sdst
!
: (6)
Our strategy is to use pre-determined observations to explain programme
participation in order to mitigate further endogeneity issues. For this purpose,
we use observations for years 1997 to 1999 to estimate equation (6). Table 10
presents the results of the logit estimation of equation (6). We present two
alternative specications in order to assess whether the results are sensitive to the
exclusion of intangible assets as a determinant of participation. The coecient
on our instrumental variable turns out to be positive and strongly signicant in
both specications, corroborating the fact that the available funding is indeed an
important predictor of participation in the programme.
The market share variable, measuring rms' relative size, is positive and signif-
icant in all the specications. This is in accordance with the \technology watch"
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explanation presented above, which suggest that relatively large rms in their
industry (i.e. leaders) may have an incentive to participate in the programme to
monitor the innovative activity in their segment.
Although signicant in only two of the samples, the HHI variable shows a
positive impact on the probability of participation, indicating that rms coming
from more concentrated (or less fragmented) industries are more likely to partic-
ipate. As argued above, this result is consistent with the fact that rms nd it
easier to identify suitable partners in such industries. Also, the latter give greater
scope for the internalization of spillovers.
The coecient associated with employees, a measure of rm size, is positive
and highly signicant when the IC-Rep and Random samples are used15. As
noted in Hernan, Marn, and Siotis (2003), this indicates that absolute rm size
is an important determinant of programme participation and may reect the ex-
istence of large xed costs associated with RJV formation (for example large
administrative and negotiation eorts necessary to reach agreements with part-
ners). It may also be the result of certain preferences for large rms from the
EU-FP5 organization. The xed assets intensity, a measure of capital intensity,
is a positive predictor of participation, but turns out do be signicantly so in the
Random sample only, when the intangible xed assets intensity is not included
as a regressor (specication (1)). When the latter is included, its corresponding
coecient is positive and signicant, showing the important correlation between
the xed assets and intangible xed assets variables. Although the coecient
on the intangible assets intensity variable actually shows up to be positive and
signicant for the Random sample only, it is still positive for our two other sam-
ples. This reects the fact that R&D activities and the absorptive capacity of a
rm are important determinants of programme participation.
In the second step of our procedure, we replace the participation dummy by
the predicted values obtained in the rst step. We use observations from years
2000 to 2006 to estimate the impact of participation on the rms' performance.
Before turning to the discussion of the results, it is important to recall the in-
terpretation that must be given to the instrumental variable estimates in our
setting. The availability of an instrumental variable allows to identify the av-
15This coecient is not signicant for the Sales-Rep sample given that we constructed it
to replicate the participants' sales, a variable highly correlated with rms' size.
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erage treatment eect (ATE) on the participants (the treated) if our constant
treatment eect assumption holds true. In the case where the treatment eects
are actually heterogeneous, the instrumental variable is not enough to identify
a causal eect on the treated, but identies instead the local average treatment
eect (LATE) as proposed by Imbens and Angrist (1994). The LATE is the av-
erage treatment eect for the rms whose treatment status (participant or not)
is inuenced by changes in the instrumental variable (the so-called compliers).
For the LATE to be identied, an additional monotonicity assumption still needs
to be met. This assumption essentially says that the instrument must aect the
participation decision in a monotone way: if, on average, participation is more
likely given a value of the instrument Z = w than given Z = z, then any rm who
would participate given Z = z must also participate given Z = w. In our setting,
this means that a participating rm facing a given value of available funding
would still be willing to participate if it were facing a larger amount of funding.
This assumption is likely to hold in our context. Our results should therefore be
interpreted as the average impact of the programme for those rms induced to
participate as a result of the change in the funding available to them. In other
words, they present the average eect of the programme for the subpopulation of
\marginal" participants. Although the identication of this subpopulation may
not be straightforward, we believe that having a consistent estimate of the LATE
parameter is relevant for our purposes. In particular, since our instrument (the
available funding) is itself a policy variable, it can be used to implement policy
changes that may be suggested by our results.
Columns (IV1) and (IV2) of tables 11 and 12 show the results of estimating
(3) replacing the participation dummy variable by its predicted value from the
corresponding rst stage logit estimation in table 10. Concerning the impact
of participation on labor productivity, we nd that the instantaneous eect is
positive and signicant. For the rms at the margin of participating, engaging
in a RJV from the IST programme raises labor productivity in about 25 to 34%,
while it shows no signicant impact on the prot margin
Given the pre-competitive nature of EU-FP5 projects, the positive instanta-
neous eect presented above may actually be the immediate result of the funding
received16. We therefore also analyze the eect of participation on performance
16The need to measure the long term impact of participation in EU-FP has already been noted
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in the subsequent years after entering a project.
The results are presented in tables 13 and 14 for lagged eects up to 4 years.
When considering labor productivity as a performance measure, the coecients
show that participation in the programme has a positive and signicant impact
up to 4 years after entering a project and accounts for increases in productivity in
roughly 31 to 38%. Although no eects were found for the instantaneous eects
on the prot margin, our results show that participation leads to an increase of
4 to 5 percentage points three to four years after entering the project (although
this result holds in two of our three samples).
6.2 Analysis by RJV size
The results presented in the previous section showed a positive eect of partici-
pation on the performance of the rms. Given that the RJVs present in our data
set are quite heterogeneous in terms of total cost/funding, it is interesting to see
if these gains in productivity are associated with the size of the project in which
each rm participates. A rst step is to estimate the eect of participation using
pooled OLS on the following specication:
yit+ = x
0
it + 
L
  PARTSLit + S  PARTSSit + "it+ ; (7)
where PARTSLit = 1 if rm i has already entered or is currently participating
in a large (L) project and PARTSSit = 1 if rm i has already entered or is
currently participating in a small (S) project. We dene a large RJV as being
one with a total budget of more than 2.8 million euros, which is the median value
of the distribution of the projects' cost in our sample. The vector x includes the
same covariates as in equation (3). Columns (OLS) of tables 16 and 17 show the
results of running pooled OLS for years 2000 to 2006 on 7 for, respectively, labor
productivity and prot margin as outcome measures.
Since the size of the RJV is also the result of a decision made by the partners
in the project, one must take this endogeneity into account. To this end, we next
use our instrumental variables approach to estimate the eect of participation in
the two dierent kinds of RJVs. Our strategy is similar to the one we followed
by most empirical analysis (see Dekker and Kleinknecht (2008), Benfratello and Sembenelli
(2002), Barajas, Huergo, and Moreno (2009)).
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in section 6.1 and still consists of two steps. However, we now want to specify an
equation that explains participation in the two dierent types of projects. Each
rm i can therefore choose among three alternatives: participate in an large
project, participate in a small project or participate in neither of them (i.e. stay
out of the programme). We dene the dependant variable PARTic to take value
1 if project c is ever chosen, where c = Large; Small;Out: We now specify the
following model for the probability that rm i chooses project c,
Pr(PARTic = 1 j z) =F(z0it)
=F
 
0 + 1 log(Employees)it + 2 log
FixedAssets
Employees

it
+3 log
IntangibleAssets
Employees

it
+ 4HHIit + 5MktShareit
+6 log(AvailableFunding)i
+
CX
c=1
cCountryic +
JX
j=1
jIndustryij +
99X
s=98
sdst
!
: (8)
where F() is the multinomial logistic cumulative distribution function. The
multinomial logit estimation is again done using the pre-programme observations
(t = 1997; 1998; 1999) to mitigate endogeneity issues. The two specications we
estimate are the same than the ones we used in section 6.1, and the results are
presented in table 15.
In the rst specication (rst part of the table), the intangible xed assets
intensity is left out of equation (8). The coecient on our instrumental variable
is again positive and strongly signicant for both small and large RJVs and in
both specications. Almost all of the remaining explanatory variables have the
same sign as in our simple logit model. The coecient associated with employees
is strongly signicant (except for the Sales-Rep sample, see footnote 15) in
predicting participation in both types of RJVs. Capital intensity is a positive
predictor of participation, and always a more important one for larger projects.
Although not signicant, it even shows to be negative for small projects in two
of our samples. On the contrary, the intangible assets intensity is a stronger
positive predictor for participation in smaller project, although only signicantly
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so in the Random sample. Firms' relative size is again positively related to
participation, but is signicant only for the larger RJVs. This again corroborates
our \technology watch" interpretation and further suggests that for a leading rm,
monitoring the innovative activity in its sector is more relevant when the projects
are of an important size. These kinds of projects are indeed the ones where
competing rms could gain the most and take the technological lead. Finally, the
HHI index still has a positive sign for both large and small projects and is only
signicant for one of our samples.
In the second step of our procedure, we replace the participation dummies by
the predicted values obtained in the rst step. We again use observations from
years 2000 to 2006 to estimate the impact of participation in both types of RJVs
on the rms' performance. Tables 16 and 17 show the estimation results for re-
spectively labor productivity and prot margin as dependent variables. Columns
(IV1) and (IV2) present the results of estimating (7) and replacing the partic-
ipation dummy variables by their predicted values from the corresponding rst
stage multinomial logit estimation in table 15.
We observe that the instantaneous impact of participation is quite dierent
for large and small projects. The positive and signicant eect of participation
on labor productivity found above seems to come mainly from participation in
the large RJVs. For the IC-Rep and Sales-Rep samples, the impact of partic-
ipation is actually much lower for small projects than for large ones and is not
statistically dierent from zero. For the impact on prot margin, the results show
that participation in small projects leads to lower performance than participation
in large RJVs.
These results are conrmed when turning to the lagged eects of participa-
tion in the dierent types of RJVs. Our Random sample did not show a clear
dierence between the instantaneous eect on labor productivity of participation
in large and small projects. However, the lagged eects present a stark dierence
between the two in all of our samples. The results are presented in table 18
and show important gains on labor productivity (up to 60%) from participating
in large projects. Table 19 presents the results when performance is measured
by the prot margin. The pattern appears to be clearer than for the instan-
taneous eects and reveals a positive (although not always signicant) impact
from participating in large RJVs, especially starting 2 years after entering the
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project. Participation in large projects leads to increases in as much as 8 per-
centage points, while participation in small projects leads to decreases to up to
6 percentage points in one of our samples.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we analyze the eects of R&D collaboration within the Fifth Eu-
ropean Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development on
rms' performance.
Previous literature has shown that participation in RJVs supported by the
EU-FP has no relevant impact on rms' economic performance, a fact mainly ex-
plained by the pre-competitiveness of the programme and its non market-oriented
projects. By concentrating on the IST programme, we focus our analysis on the
most industry-driven projects, which are likely to be closer to the market than
the average EU-FP5 project. We further circumvent the self selection problem
using the funding available to the rms as an instrumental variable and esti-
mate the Local Average Treatment Eect (LATE) of participation on the labor
productivity and prot margin of the rms.
Our results show that participation raises labor productivity by almost 40%
three to four years after entering the project, while participation in large RJVs
raises labor productivity by up to 60%. We also nd a positive eect of par-
ticipation on the prot margin three to four years after entering an RJV, with
participation leading to an increase of 4 to 5 percentage points three to four years
after entering the project. These results hold mainly for large projects though,
and we nd that participation in small RJVs actually decreases the prot margin
by up to 5 percentage points.
Although these estimates might sound surprising given previous studies' re-
sults, it is crucial to recall the interpretation that they must be given. The
LATE is the average treatment eect for the rms whose treatment status (par-
ticipant or not) is inuenced by changes in the instrumental variable, and our
results should therefore be interpreted as the average impact of the programme
for the subpopulation of \marginal" participants. Even though the identication
of this subpopulation may not be straightforward, we believe that our results are
economically and policy relevant since our instrument (the available funding) is
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itself a policy variable. According to our estimations, raising the available fund-
ing would encourage the participation of certain rms that would greatly benet
from it.
8 Appendix
8.1 Tables
Table 1: Number of Projects per rm
Number of projects Number of rms Per cent Cumul.
1 620 64.52 64.52
2 140 14.57 79.08
3 64 6.66 85.74
4 34 3.54 89.28
5 21 2.19 91.47
6 14 1.46 92.92
7 8 0.83 93.76
8 7 0.73 94.48
9 7 0.73 95.21
10 or more 46 4.79 100.00
Table 2: Mean statistics by project
Variable All Projects Single Part Sample
Nb of Participants 7.00 8.58 8.77
Duration (in months) 27.04 27.93 27.4
Cost (thousand e) 2376.54 2999.21 3002.23
Funding (thousand e) 1380.21 1663.37 1638.60
Nb of Projects 2359 466 315
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Table 3: Projects' characteristics by starting year
Starting Nb of RJVs Avg size Duration Cost Funding
Year (nb of rms) per RJV in months in thousand e in thousand e
2000 96 (30.5 %) 8.23 27.55 3096.99 1683.81
2001 108 (34.3 %) 8.69 27.62 2761.45 1502.80
2002 104 (33.0 %) 9.33 26.68 3240.63 1786.52
2003 7 (2.22 %) 9.29 32.57 1875.71 916.29
All 315 8.77 27.40 3002.23 1638.60
Table 4: Projects' characteristics by number of participants
Nb of participants Nb of RJVs Duration Cost Funding
in months in thousand e in thousand e
3 or less 14 (4.4 %) 17.21 631.56 444.35
4 to 5 36 (11.4 %) 28.19 2429.06 1345.53
6 to 7 89 (28.2 %) 27.94 2657.61 1476.00
8 to 10 105 (33.3 %) 27.12 2874.11 1581.15
11 to 15 48 (15.2 %) 29.25 4163.96 2167.86
16 or more 23 (7.3 %) 27.65 4836.39 2611.22
All 315 27.40 3002.23 1638.60
Table 5: Projects' characteristics by cost
Cost Nb of RJVs Duration Avg size Funding
in millions in months (nb of rms) per RJV in thousand e
0 to 1 53 (16.8%) 18.49 6.68 430.35
1 to 3 122 (38.7%) 28.35 8.13 1191.41
3 to 6 111 (35.2%) 29.91 9.33 2145.41
6 to 8 21 (6.7%) 30.48 13.00 3394.76
more than 8 8 (2.5%) 29.00 13.63 4821.25
All 315 27.40 8.77 1638.60
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Table 6: Projects' characteristics by duration
Duration Nb of RJVs Avg size Cost Funding
in years (nb of rms) per RJV in thousand e in thousand e
0 to 1 15 (4.8%) 6.87 488.39 377.80
1 to 2 136 (43.2%) 8.54 2539.97 1384.91
2 to 3 143 (45.4%) 9.14 3553.23 1929.46
3 to 4 19 (6.0%) 9.63 4160.00 2206.39
4 to 5 2 (0.6%) 4.50 2895.00 2155.00
All 315 8.77 3002.23 1638.60
Table 7: Comparison of participants and Amadeus for 1999
Participants Amadeus
Mean Median N Mean Median N
Sales 1,617,717.1 61,192.0 560 76,461.5 12,648.0 91475
Employees 7,833.5 441.0 522 482.4 87.0 102273
Fixed Assets 1,295,842.3 15,400.5 598 60,009.1 2,112.0 146753
Intangible Fixed Assets 147,837.6 381.5 582 5,413.6 2.0 140781
Labor Productivity 317.9 63.2 380 141.7 49.0 71872
Costs of Employees 366,136.9 20,507.0 508 14,431.1 1,882.0 106638
Mean Wage 49.6 42.5 448 57.5 31.1 91759
Prot Margin 5.8 4.9 560 5.0 3.0 124496
Gross Prot Margin 40.1 35.9 140 69.0 18.3 42718
 Cannot reject the null hypothesis (equality of the means) in a two-tailed t-test at the 5% level
between the participants and the corresponding control group in each column.
 Cannot reject the null hypothesis (equality of the means) in a two-tailed t-test at the 10% level
between the participants and the corresponding control group in each column.
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Table 8: Fixed Eects estimation results: Labor productivityy
Sample Random IC-Rep Sales-Rep
(FE1) (FE2) (FE1) (FE2) (FE1) (FE2)
Constant 4.868 4.899 5.472 5.502 5.695 5.721
(0.25) (0.24) (0.31) (0.31) (0.44) (0.44)
Employees -0.371-0.368-0.424-0.424-0.423-0.423
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Fixed Assets Intensity 0.187 0.177 0.178 0.169 0.178 0.173
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Intang Fixed Assets 0.018 0.015 0.008
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Market Share 2.046 2.068 1.969 2.013 1.934 1.926
(0.90) (0.90) (0.95) (0.96) (0.86) (0.86)
HHI 0.060 0.063 -0.009 -0.007 0.013 0.014
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
PARTS -0.031 -0.037 0.010 0.007 0.037 0.035
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Within R2 0.285 0.287 0.324 0.325 0.33 0.33
Number of obs. 7105 7105 5898 5898 4498 4498
y Standard errors in parenthesis.
 Signicant at the 10% level.
 Signicant at the 5% level.
 Signicant at the 1% level.
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Table 9: Fixed Eects estimation results: Prot marginy
Sample Random IC-Rep Sales-Rep
(FE1) (FE2) (FE1) (FE2) (FE1) (FE2)
Constant 0.051 0.050 0.065 0.055 0.071 0.057
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06)
Employees -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Fixed Assets Intensity -0.001 -0.001 -0.005 -0.002 -0.007 -0.004
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Intang Fixed Assets 0.000 -0.005 -0.004
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Market Share -0.009 -0.009 0.012 -0.003 -0.018 -0.013
(0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12)
HHI 0.008 0.007 -0.011 -0.011 -0.005 -0.006
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
PARTS 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.000
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Within R2 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.013 0.007 0.012
Number of obs. 7105 7105 5898 5898 4498 4498
y Standard errors in parenthesis.
 Signicant at the 10% level.
 Signicant at the 5% level.
 Signicant at the 1% level.
29
Table 10: First stage estimation results (logit)y
Sample Random IC-Rep Sales-Rep
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Constant -6.795-6.153-8.635-8.357-6.917-9.288
(1.49) (1.51) (2.10) (2.16) (1.64) (2.05)
Employees 0.427 0.451 0.501 0.502 0.012 0.013
(0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
Fixed Assets Intensity 0.201 0.134 0.104 0.085 0.055 0.037
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Intang Assets Intensity 0.120 0.039 0.033
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Available Funding 0.507 0.499 0.459 0.455 0.515 0.513
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Market Share 6.229 6.044 6.621 6.452 3.123 3.047
(2.18) (2.32) (2.35) (2.38) (1.61) (1.60)
HHI 2.271 2.303 1.216 1.181 4.238 4.237
(1.12) (1.11) (0.82) (0.82) (1.20) (1.19)
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Pseudo-R2 0.436 0.443 0.291 0.292 0.37 0.37
Number of obs. 1667 1667 1545 1545 1362 1362
y Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered at the rm level.
 Signicant at the 10% level.
 Signicant at the 5% level.
 Signicant at the 1% level.
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Table 15: Analysis by RJV Size: First stage estimation results (Multinomial
logit)y
Sample Random IC-Rep Sales-Rep
(1) Large Small Large Small Large Small
Constant -8.889-4.166 -9.593-4.989-7.284-3.130
(2.78) (1.98) (1.92) (1.50) (1.82) (1.73)
Employees 0.365 0.452 0.465 0.508 0.018 -0.038
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09)
Fixed Assets Intensity 0.257 0.110 0.160 0.030 0.126 -0.067
(0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
Available Funding 0.799 0.367 0.668 0.271 0.823 0.373
(0.11) (0.05) (0.10) (0.04) (0.12) (0.05)
Market Share 10.670 3.775 8.405 2.947 5.811 1.590
(2.62) (2.09) (1.86) (1.62) (2.09) (2.33)
HHI 1.840 1.879 0.751 0.917 4.086 4.372
(1.42) (1.13) (0.96) (0.98) (1.34) (1.27)
Pseudo-R2 0.381 0.261 0.326
Number of Obs. 1667 1550 1362
(2) Large Small Large Small Large Small
Constant -9.393-5.528-9.380-5.639-9.260-3.582
(2.03) (1.84) (1.71) (1.61) (1.74) (1.55)
Employees 0.386 0.475 0.467 0.507 0.018 -0.034
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09)
Fixed Assets Intensity 0.204 0.030 0.143 -0.001 0.127 -0.111
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11)
Intang Fixed Assets 0.093 0.140 0.037 0.060 0.003 0.072
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Available Funding 0.789 0.356 0.665 0.265 0.829 0.369
(0.11) (0.05) (0.10) (0.04) (0.13) (0.05)
Market Share 10.571 3.586 8.239 2.737 5.877 1.326
(2.70) (2.23) (1.87) (1.65) (2.10) (2.43)
HHI 1.792 1.887 0.725 0.847 4.029 4.370
(1.41) (1.15) (0.96) (1.00) (1.35) (1.28)
Pseudo-R2 0.387 0.262 0.328
Number of Obs. 1667 1550 1362
y Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered at the rm level. All specications
include time, industry and country dummies. The reference outcome is not partici-
pating in the EU-FP5 IST programme.
 Signicant at the 10% level.
 Signicant at the 5% level.
 Signicant at the 1% level.
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Figure 1: Sales distributions for participants, Amadeus and Control Groups in
1999.
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8.2 Replication of the participants' distribution
In order to construct the control group, we'll try to replicate the distribution
of participants according to their size (measured by the number of employees,
sales and xed assets). The idea is as follows. For each percentile of the partici-
pants' distribution, we count the number of rms and try to reconstruct a similar
distribution with the rms in Amadeus . For example, we have 6 participants
below the rst percentile (i.e. 6 rms with less or equal than 627'000 e of sales).
In order to replicate the distribution, we count the number of Amadeus rms
that have less or equal than this value (this gives 5219 observations) and draw
randomly 6 observations (rms) from this group.
We then count the number of participants between the rst and second per-
centile, i.e. the number of rms with more than 627'000 and less or equal than
1'441'000 e of sales. This gives us 6 rms. We again count the number of
Amadeus rms that have more than 627'000 and less or equal than 1'441'000
e of sales (this gives 4076 observations) and randomly draw 6 observations from
them. After the procedure is replicated until the last percentile, we end up with
a control group that has a similar distribution of rms in terms of sales.
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